Månedlige arkiver: mai 2011

Hvem blir den neste sjefen for IMF? La oss sjekke oddsen.

Få din engelske venn til å sette noen penger på din favoritt:

The IMF oddsmakers:

The Economist has one list of William Hill odds for who’s going to succeed Dominique Strauss-Kahn as managing director of the IMF; William Hill itself has a slightly different list. I would be much obliged if a reader in the UK would please pop down to William Hill for me and place a lot of money on Christine Lagarde at 20-1, as she’s listed on the William Hill site, or even at 14-1, where the Economist has her.

Kemal Dervis is the clear favorite here. But I don’t buy it: for one thing, the single most important issue facing the managing director of the IMF right now is Greece. And the bad blood between Greece and Turkey is so deep and so ingrained that I simply can’t see how any Turk could be credibly impartial on the subject of Greece.

Second-favorite is Montek Singh Ahluwalia, who at 67 is too old for the job. He’s followed by the top EU official on the list, Axel Weber. Again, given that the head of the IMF is going to be essentially brokering a deal between Greece, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, it doesn’t make sense to me to put a German in that job.

Also near the top of the list are Gordon Brown, who’s already been ruled out by David Cameron; John Lipsky, who’s American and therefore a non-starter for anything but a temporary position; and Peer Steinbrück, who’s also German. Interestingly, Arminio Fraga is not on the list at all, and neither is Turkish finance minister Mehmet Simsek, one of the few people to openly lobby for the position.

If it were possible to short these odds, I’d happily short all Turks, Germans, and North Americans, including Mark Carney and Agustin Carstens. But since it’s not, I’ll make do with a long bet on Lagarde. Anybody willing to help me out?

Update: William Hill have now tightened Lagarde in to 10/1. Still worth a £25 bet, though. Thank you Matt!

(Via Felix Salmon.)

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Akademisk forskning om voldtekter og internett; tall fra Norge

Snublet over denne artikkelen, som er på den sensasjonalistiske (er det et ord?) siden. Norsk data om forbrytelser og internett. Takk til The Monkey Cage som kommenterer:

Is the internet causing half the rapes in Norway? I wanna see the scatterplot.:

Ryan King writes:

This involves causal inference, hierarchical setup, small effect sizes (in absolute terms), and will doubtless be heavily reported in the media.

The article is by Manudeep Bhuller, Tarjei Havnes, Edwin Leuven, and Magne Mogstad and begins as follows:

Does internet use trigger sex crime? We use unique Norwegian data on crime and internet adoption to shed light on this question. A public program with limited funding rolled out broadband access points in 2000-2008, and provides plausibly exogenous variation in internet use. Our instrumental variables and fixed effect estimates show that internet use is associated with a substantial increase in reported incidences of rape and other sex crimes. We present a theoretical framework that highlights three mechanisms for how internet use may affect reported sex crime, namely a reporting effect, a matching effect on potential offenders and victims, and a direct effect on crime propensity. Our results indicate that the direct effect is non-negligible and positive, plausibly as a result of increased consumption of pornography.

How big is the effect?

A 1 percentage point increase in internet use is associated with an increase in rapes of 0.14 and an increase in child sex abuse of 0.16, per 100,000 inhabitants. The effects on the overall sex crime rate and rapes are precisely estimated, being statistically significant at the 5%-level.

How much is this? A 1% change in internet use seems uninteresting. Perhaps we should multiply by 50? A 50% increase in internet use (which is roughly what was observed in Norway, according to one of the graphs) is associated in their fitted model with an increase in rapes of 7 per 100,000 and in increase in child sex abuse of 8 per 100,000.

How big are these numbers? According to Figure 4, the overall rate of rape is about 15 per 100,000 and the overall rate of child sex abuse is about 25 per 100,000. So, unless I’m missing something here, the estimate is that about half the rapes and one-third of the child sex abuse are caused by the internet.

(Figures 2-4 confused me at first because the time axes are on different scales.)

I don’t have it in me to try to evaluate this paper in detail. But what I really want to see here is a scatterplot. I want to see what the data say: where is the leverage coming from? Presumably the sex crimes rates are increasing faster in certain cities than others, coinciding to some extent with internet coverage. I’d just like to see the basic pattern to understand where the conclusions are coming from. A scatterplot is not the end of the analysis but it would be a good beginning.

I’d also like to see a more direct analysis to go along with the instrumental variable model. You can think of the instrument has having a joint effect on the intermediate and final outcomes.

Finally, the seriousness of the topic aside, I can’t helped but be amused by the authors’ use of econ-jargon. As everybody knows, in an applied micro paper you can’t just run the regression and give your results, you have to start with a theoretical model. Which in this case begins with, ‘For a crime to happen, we need (at least) two individuals meeting each other.’ What about burglary??

On the next page we see the delightful expression ‘dp/dporn,’ which actually looks even better in real life because the d’s are those curly partial-derivative d’s and the first p is a rho. OK, here’s the full version; read it and weep:

dp.png

Also, ‘most of what we know about dp/dporn is either circumstantial or anecdotal.’

All this theory doesn’t really hurt any, but I think it all comes down to the data analysis.

(Via The Monkey Cage.)

Èn ting er sikkert: du ser ikke en slik derivering ofte.

Om det norske boligmerkedet #227: Katrine Boye fra Nordea Markets

I føljetongen her, her og her følger Katrine Boye fra Nordea Markets opp med følgende utsagn, via dn.no:

Ikke en eneste dempende faktor

Boye viser til at antall omsatte boliger for tiden ligger nær 6.000 per måned, mens da markedet var som svakest høsten 2008 var det bare rundt 4.000 omsatte per måned. Tilbudet av boliger til salgs på finn.no har også sunket betydelig. Høsten 2008 var det i gjennomsnitt rundt 19.000 boliger til salgs hver måned, mens gjennomsnittet det siste året var rundt 13.000.

Det er flere faktorer som driver boligprisene, peker Boye på. De som ofte trekkes frem er lånerente, inntektsutvikling, arbeidsledighet, grad av optimisme blant forbrukere og boligbygging relativt til befolkningsveksten

– Det er for tiden ikke én av disse faktorene som virker dempende på boligprisene, heller motsatt.

Medforfatter av Nordeas rapport om økonomisk utsikt Steinar Juel legger til:

– Boligprisene er blitt svært høye, og er i ferd med å bli for høye til å tåle en styringsrente på 4-5 prosent. Norges Bank synes i rentesettingen å ha blitt mer opptatt av den risiko høye boligpriser og høyt gjeldnivå hos husholdningene representerer

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Statistisk sentralbyrå spør nordmenn om bistand.

Fig 2011 05 18 01
For noen måneder siden postet vi denne bloggposten om norsk bistand. Og når oppgaver er innlevert og eksamener overstått poster vi en ny del om norsk bistand. I mellomtiden har SSB oppdatert sine tall om nordmenn og bistand. Ifølge SSB bruker Norge ca. 28 milliarder på bistandbudsjettet, som representerer ca. 1,1% av BNP (28/2505). Her er en interessant graf:
Fig 2011 05 18 03Troverdighet er viktig i utviklingsdebatten og Verdensbanken og det Internasjonale Pengefondet sliter med effektiviteten.

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Hva? Kina møter Zimbabwe i ny skole: ‘The Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence’

Fascinerende lesing. Noen Zimbabwe/Kina-vitere som vil kommentere på denne:

Yet more unexpected sentences: «

[Zimbabwean] Defence minister Emerson Mnangagwa has told Parliament that the Chinese would channel the money through Treasury for the completion of the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence.

Yes, you read that right.

The College will reportedly offer a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence and is poised to annually award both graduate and undergraduate degrees in Intelligence.

It appears to be a spy training center, and presumably opposition members will not be getting scholarships.

Story here. Hat tip @blakehounshell.

(Via Chris Blattman.)

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God 17. Mai forresten, her er noen fakta fra Timothy Geithner

17mai2011
Alle feiret den norske nasjonaldagen, inkludert Darth Vader. I mellomtiden stopper ikke budsjettdiskusjoner i mange land. Finansminister Timothy Geithner i USA presiserer noen enkle men viktige fakta som bør innramme diskusjonen:

Geithner Offers Fiscal Facts – Real Time Economics – WSJ: «By David Wessel

Here are five facts that Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner offered in a speech in New York Tuesday as  ‘context for the [fiscal] choices we must make now to preserve room for important investments in our future.’

• In the U.S. today , 40% of children born each year are covered by Medicaid.  If you are born today in hard-pressed communities in many American cities, like St. Louis or Baltimore, you are more likely to die before your first birthday than if you were born in Sri Lanka or Belarus.

• In education, we’re losing ground…. In Los Angeles, only about half the kids graduate from high school.

• Over the next 25 years, the number of Americans eligible for Medicare and Social Security will nearly double, while the number of working age Americans will only increase by about 10%, putting substantial new burdens on working Americans.

• We spend $700 billion a year on national security… about two-thirds of what we spent as a share of our economy during the Cold War.

• The effective income tax rate for the wealthiest Americans—those earning more than $250,000 a year—is at its lowest level in 50 years. And the effective rate for the very rich—those earning over $10 million per year— has declined much further and is now around 21%.»

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Om publisering av akademiske artikler.

Denne er verdt å lese for alle som føler for å sitere en rapport eller artikkel som bevis for synspukter:

Academic research: Use with caution:

That’s the recommendation from Holden at GiveWell, after a long look at microlending debate between Mark Pitt and critics David Roodman and Jonathan Morduch.

Holden gives excellent advice. An excerpt:

Never put too much weight on a single study. If nothing else, the issue of publication bias makes this an important guideline…

Strive to understand the details of a study before counting it as evidence. Many ‘headline claims’ in studies rely on heavy doses of assumption and extrapolation…

If a study’s assumptions, extrapolations and calculations are too complex to be easily understood, this is a strike against the study. Complexity leaves more room for errors and judgment calls, and means it’s less likely that meaningful critiques have had the chance to emerge…

If a study does not disclose the full details of its data and calculations, this is another strike against it – and this phenomenon is more common than one might think…

Context is key. We often see charities or their supporters citing a single study as ‘proof’ of a strong statement (about, for example, the effectiveness of a program).

I could not have said it better. The post is worth reading in full.

Publication and confirmation bias are horrifically rampant. I am struggling to obtain 4-year old data for a replication myself, at the moment.

Two changes I would consider:

1. Journals should require submission of replication data and code files with final paper submissions, for posting on the journal site. (The Journal of Conflict Resolution is one of the few major political science or economics journals I know that does so faithfully.)

2. PhD field and method courses ought to encourage replication projects as term assignments. (Along with encouragements to diplomacy–something new scholars are slow to learn, to their detriment.)

Other suggestions for the profession?

(Via Chris Blattman.)

Og her er hva jeg holder på med for tiden, replikering av data fra en annen artikkel:
KraaygrowthMS

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Når banker spiller skittent. Veldig skittent. Jeg ser på dere, Deutsche Bank.

Dette er en oppfølger til denne posten, men la meg kjapt oppsummere. I USA pågår nå oppsigelser av boliglån amass. Dette betyr at lånetagere som f.eks ikke kan betale låneavdragene må gjøre opp med banken, eller at banker som har pant i bolig overtar boligen. Problemet er at slik som boliglån ble oppstykket og solgt videre gjør det vanskelig for banker å bevise hvem som faktisk eier lånet som lånetakere betaler på.

I den forrige blogposten om dette henviste jeg til en ’60 Minutes’ reportasje om akkurat dette. Lynn Szymoniak var en av de som akkurat nå krangler med banken sin, Deutsche Bank, om hvem som eier lånet. Det hele startet med at banken ville heve renten på lånet, men i følge låneavtalen kan 1) ikke rentehevingen være større enn en gitt prosent og 2) hevingen må gjøres og kunngjøres innenfor visse datoer i året.

Deutsche Bank bommet på disse tidsfristene, men satte opp renten uansett. Szymoniak påpekte dette og sluttet å betale det hun mente var en altfor høy sum fra en ulovlig renteheving. Banken saksøkte og det var i denne prosessen Szymoniak, som også er en av USAs fremste eksperter på forfalskning, begynte å lure. Etter etterforskning kunne hun bevise at signaturer som skulle bekrefte lånedokumenter var forfalsket.

Så hva gjør Deutsche Bank:

Deutsche Bank Sues Foreclosure Fraud Expert’s Son With No Financial Interest In Her Case

After she’d been sued, Szymoniak said, she began investigating the documentation on Florida foreclosures, uncovering alarming irregularities, including signatures that were apparently forged. If so, those signatures allowed banks to push foreclosures through overly quickly, charge improper fees and assert improperly inflated borrower debts.

Shortly after appearing on «60 Minutes» Szymoniak won a major victory in her own foreclosure case. The court found that Deutsche Bank was unable to demonstrate ownership of her mortgage, which had originally been issued by the defunct subprime mortgage lender Option One, and threw the case out.

Deutsche Bank was permitted to refile their case if they could obtain proper documentation, however. And on Friday, May 6, Szymoniak received a notification from the bank’s lawyers that she was again being sued for foreclosure.

But Deutsche Bank wasn’t just going after her. The bank was also attempting to sue her son, Mark Cullen, who is currently pursuing a graduate degree in poetry at the New School in New York. Cullen hasn’t lived in Szymoniak’s house for seven years and is not a party to any aspect of her mortgage — he has no interest in either the property or the loan, and never has had any such interest, according to Szymoniak.

«It is just absolute harassment,» Szymoniak said. «He doesn’t own anything, for god’s sake! He’s getting a masters in poetry. He not only doesn’t have any money, he’s never going to have any money.»

And other Florida foreclosure experts say it’s difficult to interpret Deutsche Bank’s move as anything other than retaliation for Szymoniak’s media presence. If it is not, in fact, retaliation, they argue, then Deutsche Bank’s lawyers have demonstrated rank incompetence.

«It sounds crazy,» said Margery Golant, a principal with the foreclosure defense law firm of Golant & Golant PA in Florida. «I can think of no legitimate reason, if he doesn’t have some connection to the property or to the mortgage, to include him in an action to foreclosure.»

«It’s an intimidation tool,» said Matt Englett, a partner at the Florida law firm Kaufman Englett Lynd PLLC. «Most people, they get scared and they get nervous and I think that’s the effect that they’re trying to have on him and his mother.»

«If he’s not an owner of the house, it’s pretty clearly just vindictive,» said Joshua Rosner, the managing director of Graham Fisher & Co., a mortgage investment firm. «If they’re doing it intentionally, that’s one hell of a statement. If they’re doing it randomly, that’s still pretty incredible.»

The experts said the lawsuit against Szymoniak’s son could also have negative implications for him beyond the immediate costs of fighting the foreclosure case, even though he has no financial interest in anything related to it.

«He’s going to have a lawsuit out there against him,» Englett said, «so if someone were to do some kind of background check against him, that would come up.»

Og nei, USA har ikke et forbrukerråd som kan forenkle kontrakter, sikre eierskap og notarisering av lånedokumenter. OM det så er boliglån eller kredittkort.

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Hvordan lage deg et innsidenettverk i finans

Denne uken fikk den største innsidesaken i amerikansk historie ett utfall. Raj Rajaratnam ble dømt skyldig på 14 punkter; svindel, konspirering og innsidehandling. For å beskrive hvordan han gjorde det, her er Peter Lattman og Azam Ahmed (via Felix Salmon):

How to set up an insider-trading network: «

Do you want to set up a network of insider-trading tipsters? Well, Peter Lattman and Azam Ahmed are here to tell you exactly how to do it, using the secrets of the master of the art form, Raj Rajaratnam.

Different techniques work for different people, of course, but often the direct way — a lot of money, mixed with equally large amounts of flattery — is the easiest:

As Raj Rajaratnam and Anil Kumar, a McKinsey consultant, walked out of a fund-raiser in Manhattan, Mr. Rajaratnam pulled his old friend aside and made him an offer: would Mr. Kumar provide him with insights for $500,000 a year?

‘You have such good knowledge that is worth a lot of money to me,’ he said, according to Mr. Kumar.

Mr. Kumar faced an agonizing choice. His employer barred its executives from outside consulting, but an extra half-million dollars a year — and the chance to do business with a powerful hedge fund manager — was tantalizing.

Weeks later, Mr. Kumar accepted.

It’s worth noting that at this point neither man has done anything illegal. If found out, Kumar could lose his job — but being fired, even for cause, is not a criminal offense.

Yet the die, at this point, has been cast. Raj has both a carrot and a stick with which to control Kumar: money, and the fact that he knows that Kumar has been accepting it. The two are bound into a secret conspiracy, and once you’re in such a thing it’s impossible to get out without inflicting serious pain onto yourself.

So when Raj started asking for inside information — when he started asking Kumar to do things which were actually criminal — it was easy for Kumar to say yes, and very hard for him to say no.

With other people, Raj used different techniques. Adam Smith (yes, Raj really was getting inside information from a man named Adam Smith) was probably the easiest: Raj simply brought him into Galleon as an employee, making their interests pretty much fully aligned.

With Rajiv Goel, there was a real friendship — or at least Goel thought there was. And while money changed hands as well, it wasn’t money for tips, not directly: it was more that the rich friend, Raj, helped out with things like buying a house or caring for a sick parent, while the poorer friend, Goel, desperately tried to curry Raj’s approval in the only way that he could get it.

Incidentally, only in the world of Wall Street is it unsurprising to find mid-level Intel executives being described as ‘hapless’ and ‘in need of money’ — Goel had a job that most people can only dream of, but was permanently dissatisfied. Maybe if his friends had less money than he did, instead of more — if they were in the bottom 99% of the population, rather than the top 0.01% — then he would have been happier, and would have felt much richer. Lesson of the story: don’t vacation with people who are a lot richer than you are.

And then there’s Kumar, who’s the weirdest of the lot, seeing as how he was already earning several million dollars a year at McKinsey. He was set for life, yet he accepted Raj’s $500,000 a year, and also the occasional bonus:

In 2006, Mr. Kumar agreed to another compensation scheme: Mr. Rajaratnam would pay him a year-end bonus based on his annual performance. Mr. Kumar proved his worth that year, providing him with details about secret merger negotiations between Advanced Micro Devices and ATI Technologies…

In December, Mr. Rajaratnam told Mr. Kumar that Galleon was paying out big year-end bonuses. ‘I want to give you $1 million,’ Mr. Rajaratnam said.

‘I almost fell off my chair,’ Mr. Kumar testified.

$1 million is a lot of money for almost anyone, but in Kumar’s case it was not enough to change his standard of living at all, and it didn’t make him significantly richer than he was before. So how come Raj’s money had so much effect on him?

Kumar sticks out here in other ways, too — he’s the only informant who could be considered even more successful than Raj was, at least professionally if not in terms of raw cash. Raj had money, more money than he really knew what to do with, but Kumar had much more societal acceptance and prestige — things you definitely need if you’re going to make it all the way to the board of Goldman Sachs.

And, of course, Kumar still hasn’t been criminally charged. But I suspect that particular shoe is going to drop at some point. Now that Raj has been convicted of all 14 counts, Kumar is surely next.

(Via Felix Salmon.)

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Ezra Klein spør økonomer i USA om skatt. Svarene er avslørende i å vise avstanden mellom økonomi og politikk.

TaxBurden
All yours Ezra:

Why does the GOP hate taxes so much?:

The GOP doesn’t just hate taxes. They hate taxes so much that their stated position is they’d prefer no deficit reduction, and even a default on the debt ceiling, to even a dollar in new taxes. They hate taxes, in other words, more than they like balanced budgets, or fear a federal default. Hating taxes is the absolute, number-one core belief of the modern GOP. The question is, why?

Disliking taxes, of course, is understandable. No one likes taxes, just like no one likes visiting the dentist or going to the DMV. But most of us accept them because the alternatives are worse. The GOP’s argument, however, is that a federal default and a second financial crisis are preferable to even modest tax hikes. Now, you can argue that this is just a bargaining position, or a political posture, or an effort to keep faith with certain interest groups and donors. But I think such double-games are rarer than people think in Washington. And so I’m inclined to take John Boehner at his word.

Which is why I spent much of yesterday asking right-leaning economists to walk me through two quotes that seemed to summarize the Republican Party’s argument against taxes. The first came from Boehner on the ‘Today Show.’ ‘The fact is you can’t tax the people we expect to invest in the economy and create jobs,’ he said. The second came from Louis Woodhill, a member of the anti-tax Club for Growth’s leadership council. ‘To stimulate GDP growth, a tax cut has to cut the marginal tax rates upon which the decision-makers in the economy base their decisions to work and, above all, to invest.’

As I saw it, the argument embedded in these quotes is almost Randian. It’s that the economy depends on the actions of — and thus the taxes on — ‘the people we expect to invest in the economy and create jobs,’ ‘the decision makers.’ But I didn’t find many takers for that point among Republican elites.

Glenn Hubbard is dean of Columbia’s School of Business and former chief economist to George W. Bush. He was sitting on the stage when Boehner delivered Monday’s broadside against taxes. ‘There are two arguments,’ Hubbard told me. ‘The first is arithmetic and the second is economics. First is tax increases on the wealthy can’t be a big part of the solution. I could double taxes on the top 1 percent and it’d be a quarter of this year’s deficit. The only way you could get the deficit down through taxation is to go after middle-income taxpayers. The economics argument is that marginal tax rates effect work, entrepreneurship, savings, investment.’

But Hubbard emphasized that what mattered for decision-making was marginal tax rates — the taxes that effect whether you do one more thing. Think about it like this: Imagine you make $1,000,000 annually and we impose a 50 percent tax on every dollar of income above $1,000,000. That makes doing more worth less to you. But let’s say we cut the deduction for your health-care insurance, or your mortgage interest. That raises your taxes, and you may not like it. But it doesn’t give you a reason to work less. Quite the opposite, in fact. But Hubbard didn’t feel Boehner was giving sufficient weight to this distinction. ‘When I heard the speaker,’ he said, ‘I didn’t just hear him rule out marginal increases. I heard him rule out cutting tax expenditures, too.’ To Hubbard, that didn’t make much sense. Cutting tax expenditures wasn’t like raising tax rates. It wouldn’t be apocalyptic for the economy. It wouldn’t keep the decision-makers from investing. It might even keep them from over-investing in things we want less of, like expensive health-care insurance policies and homes.

Josh Barro, the Walter B. Wriston fellow at the Manhattan Institute, chided me for being so naive. ‘A lot of this is political,’ he said. ‘I wouldn’t assume Boehner’s doing whatever he’s doing as a first-best policy preference.’ The fear animating Republicans, according to Barro, is that we end up with three rounds of tax increases: first, the tax increases in the Affordable Care Act, the bulk of which fell on the wealthy. Second, an expiration of the Bush tax cuts for income over $250,000. And third, further tax increases on the rich as part of a coming budget deal. Add all that together and you’re looking at very, very high taxes on the rich — much higher than what we saw under Clinton.

At that point, the standard fears apply with particular force. ‘Marginal tax rates effect behavior,’ Barro continues. ‘That’s uncontroversial. ‘What’s controversial is how much they affect behavior, and what Republicans believe is that high-income people are especially sensitive because they have more flexibility to decide how much they’ll work.’ And as Barro pointed out, it’s not only Republicans who believe this. The Congressional Budget Office agrees, too. So as Barro sees it, even if Boehner thinks that in 2013 or 2014, he’s going to have to cut a deal that raises taxes, it’s a smart play to hold the line until then in order to keep total tax rates, particularly on the rich, from being raised repeatedly, to levels where they really will hurt the economy.

But Andrew Samwick, who served as chief economist on the staff of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, found the whole discussion exasperating. ‘I just find this to be a ridiculous distraction,’ he told me. ‘These are small tax changes we’re talking about. It defies any sort of logical reasoning that there’d be such large effects.’ To Samwick, the specific set-up of the tax code is, for the moment, a distant, second-order concern. The deficit looms much larger. Once we get that under control, we can worry about the precise way to set up the tax code to maximize the incentives to work and invest. But getting the deficit under control is almost certainly going to require some revenue increases. ‘I don’t think any Republican should be taken seriously on matters related to budget until they lay out a set of circumstances under which they’d be willing to raise tax rates,’ he said. ‘And I haven’t heard any Republican in leadership give even a hint of that.’

Leonard Burman isn’t a Republican economist, but he is a tax expert. He was actually deputy undersecretary for tax analysis in Bill Clinton’s Treasury Department. And when I reached him for comment, he found the whole conversation baffling. ‘You can build these models where people are very sensitive to changes in taxes,’ he said, ‘ but in practice, there’s scant evidence of it actually working out that way. And lucky for us. If we really needed to get the tax code just right in order for the economy to grow, we’d have been in a depression for the last 40 years.’

The bottom line, he says, is that these theories were tested, and recently. ‘In the 1990s, we raised taxes, particularly on the rich. And a lot of these people were saying our tax increases were going to kill the economy. But remember what actually happened? We got rid of our deficits and the economy grew really robustly for 10 years. And what if it happened again? We might get rid of our deficits and the economy would grow really robustly for another 10 years. Maybe it’s good for the economy to actually get the deficit under control.’

(Via Ezra Klein.)

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