Tag Archives: Uganda

The Global Creativity Index kom i går: Kreativitet og Innovasjon i Norge – ikke noe spesielt.

Screen shot 2011 10 04 at 13 28 28Nylig (igår) ble årets utgave av The Global Creativity Index (PDF). Forfatterne av rapporten gir en kort innføring her og det er alltid interessant å kikke etter Norge.

Bildet over viser rangeringen i kategorien teknologi, og Norge er utenfor topp 10. Vi er lavt nede i FoU (Forskning og Utvikling) investeringer og spesielt skuffende lavt rangert innen innovasjon. Vi har visstnok forskere i verdensklasse, men vi bruker ikke nok ressurser på de. Skuffende.

Screen shot 2011 10 04 at 13 29 21 Over er den totale rangeringen The Global Creativity Index, og det er en skuffende sammensetning av kvaliteter som gjør at vi kryper inn i topp 10. De kategoriene som plasserer oss i verdenstoppen blir undergravd av de andre som plasserer oss nærmere 20. plass.

Eksempel på dette er at talentrangeringen er bra (6), mens toleranserangeringen for minoriteter (16) og homofile (12) er dårlig.
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Ikke vær særlig stolt over den totale 7. plassen i rangeringen, det er sammensetningen for den plasseringen som burde bekymre.

Til sist, finner du Uganda?

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Dagbladet leker seg med Norads bistandsdatabase

Snorre Schjønberg har lekt seg med Norads bistandsdatabase, og kikket spesielt på Uganda. Oppskriften for en slik Dagbladet artikkel er ganske enkel. Du begynner med Transparency International sin rangering av de mest korrupte landene i Afrika, deretter korrelerer du disse landene med de som mottar mest bistand fra Norge:
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Afrika2010
Du finner nok av diktatorer som kjøper luksusvarer med bistandspenger, offentlige ansatte som misbruker penger osv., listen er skuffende lang. Her er Schjønberg:

Brukte 267 bistands- millioner på privatfly – nyheter – Dagbladet.no:

(Dagbladet): Ugandas president Yoweri Museveni leder et land som sliter med ekstrem fattigdom. Millioner av sivile sliter hardt med å skaffe mat dag ut og dag inn. Samtidig får landet store bistandssummer fra land som Norge og Storbritannia.

Men ikke alle pengene går de til som trenger det mest. Daily Mail skriver at det er blitt avslørt at Museveni brukte 30 millioner pund fra bistandsbudsjettet på noe helt annet enn mat, husly og utdanning til de trengende.

Pengene brukte han på å skaffe seg et Gulfstream G550-privatfly. Flyet regnes som et fly i toppklassen og kan frakte 18 passasjerer med en komfort de fleste selv her hjemme bare kan drømme om.

Siden 2000 har Uganda mottatt 3,466 milliarder kroner i bistand fra Norge. Daily Mail skriver at det var britiske bistandspenger som ble brukt til flykjøpet. Britene er i likhet med Norge blant landene som årlig gir nye pengesummer til det fattige afrikanske landet.

I fjor besto bistanden til Uganda fra Norge av 431 millioner kroner, viser tall fra NORAD.

Kjempet mot Idi Amin
President Museveni var en sentral skikkelse i krigen mot den brutale despoten Idi Amin på slutten av 1970-tallet. Siden 1986 har han vært øverste leder i Uganda.

For tiden får han kraftig kritikk for å slå hardt ned på demonstranter som krever forandring i landet. Det har gjentatte ganger kommet kritikk mot land som gir bistand direkte til de ugandiske myndighetene, på grunn av spekulasjoner om utbredt korrupsjon.

Det fremheves derfor at bistandsmidlene må forvaltes av andre enn landets myndigheter. Av de 3,4 milliardene Norge har gitt Uganda de siste ti årene er midlene blitt forvaltet på følgende måte:

1,5 milliarder til offentlig sektor

• Offentlig sektor i Uganda: 44 prosent.

• Ikke-statlige organisasjoner i Norge: 26 prosent.

• Multilaterale organisasjoner (som FN og Verdensbanken): 13 prosent.

• Offentlig sektor i Norge eller andre giverland: 8 prosent.

• Internasjonale og lokale ikke-statlige organisasjoner: 5 prosent.

• Privat sektor: 4 prosent.

Dette betyr at 1,5 norske bistandsmilliarder de siste ti årene er blitt forvaltet av offentlig sektor i Uganda.

Av disse pengene skulle 48 prosent brukes på økonomisk utvikling og handel, 29 prosent på miljø og energi, 13 prosent på utdanning, 8 prosent på godt styresett og 4 prosent på helse- og sosialsektor.

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Uganda valg og økonometri – Elliott Green med analyse etter valget.

Før valget i Uganda linket vi til Elliot Green, og nå er han tilbake med analyse etter valget er ferdig.

The graph clearly shows that Museveni’s support overwhelmingly comes from rural areas and that Uganda’s incredibly low level of urbanization – which is the third lowest in the world after Burundi and Papua New Guinea – could be one reason why Museveni continues to win elections.

For alle STATA fans der ute: grafene er lett gjenkjennelig, sant?

Uganda Post-Election Report:

We are pleased to welcome back Elliott Green, a Lecturer in Development Studies at the London School of Economics, with a post-election report on last Friday’s Ugandan presidential elections. See here for the pre-election report.

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As expected, Uganda’s election last Friday resulted in a win for President Yoweri Museveni, who managed to up his take of the vote from 59% in 2006 to 66% of the vote (or 68% of the total number of valid votes, of which more in a minute). This marked the first time Museveni won a higher percentage of the vote than he did in a previous election, which in part is due to large-scale bribing of voters. But there are three additional factors which could explain Museveni’s support, and the release of the election data on Sunday (available here) allows us to test these theories.

First, in a pre-election article in the Ugandan Independent Melina Platas suggested that Museveni would be able to exploit his incumbency advantage as he had in the past. In particular she noted a link in the 2006 election between both higher voter turnout and higher support for Museveni – which suggested the suppression of turnout in opposition areas – as well as a link between higher levels of invalid votes and lower support for Museveni, which is more reminiscent of outright fraud.

The 2011 election data clearly shows that both turnout and invalid votes are strongly correlated with Museveni’s support across Uganda’s 112 districts, as seen in the two graphs below. Just as before, Museveni’s support increased with turnout and decreased with the percentage of votes declared invalid. (I’ve also listed the coefficient, t-statistic and R2 obtained by regressing turnout and invalid votes on Museveni’s support.)

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A second theory which I wrote about in my previous post was the role of patronage, specifically the role of new districts. The results again suggest higher support for Museveni within newer districts than in older ones, as seen below:

Percentage Voting for Museveni in

New Districts (2009-2010) (n=32) 68.3%
New Districts (2006-2010) (n=42) 67.8%
All Districts (n=112) 65.6%
Districts created before 2006 (n=70) 65.0%
Districts created before 2005 (n=56) 63.2%
Districts created before 1997 (n=39) 62.5%
Districts created before 1986 (n=33) 60.1%

While voters in new districts receive the most benefit from their creation, those in the ‘mother’ districts also receive indirect benefits when their district is split, inasmuch as there is a fixed set of district administrative jobs which are then distributed across a smaller population after the split. Thus we should also expect to see an electoral effect among the 33 older districts (i.e., those created before Museveni came to power in 1986) according to when they were split up, which the data again supports:

Percentage Voting for Museveni in

Old Districts not split after 2006 (n=16) 59.8%
Old Districts not split after 2000 (n=8) 58.8%
Old Districts not split after 1997 (n=6) 56.5%
Old Districts never split (n=3) 48.9%

The three districts which have never been split are Jinja, Kampala and Kasese. Interestingly, all three districts are highly urbanized, inasmuch as they contain the 7th, 1st and 11th largest cities in the country, respectively. This then leads us to the third aspect of Museveni’s victory, namely his support in rural areas. Below I’ve plotted the relationship between Museveni’s support and urbanization levels per district – which is unfortunately only available from the last census in 2002, when Uganda had only 56 districts. (Museveni’s support is now on the vertical axis inasmuch as I’m regressing support for Museveni on urbanization.) I’ve left out Kampala as it is an obvious outlier (100% urbanization); it was also one of four districts where the main challenger Kizza Besigye beat Museveni into second place. The second-most urbanized district in 2002 was Gulu, which was subsequently broken up into Amuru, Gulu, and Nwoya districts; in last week’s election all three districts were carried by Gulu district chairman Norbert Mao.

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The graph clearly shows that Museveni’s support overwhelmingly comes from rural areas and that Uganda’s incredibly low level of urbanization – which is the third lowest in the world after Burundi and Papua New Guinea – could be one reason why Museveni continues to win elections. Museveni’s rural vote could be tied up with levels of education and development more generally, but district-level Human Development Index data from the 2007 Uganda Human Development Report is not significantly associated with Museveni’s support. I suspect that his support comes in part from the greater importance of patronage in rural areas and in part from greater access to media in urban areas, but this remains something for further analysis.

In conclusion we can see how Museveni was successfully able to employ a stick and carrot approach to win the election, using both the suppression of voter turnout and valid votes in opposition areas alongside the creation of new districts and patronage more generally in rural areas as means to win him yet another 5-year term in office.

(Via The Monkey Cage.)

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Uganda | 68% mot 27% i valget. The Economist rapporterer.

Representanter fra EU erklærte valget i Uganda for et fredfylt valg.

The old man of Kampala, The Economist:

THE streets in Kampala today were peaceful; bored even after Uganda’s general election on February 18th. Just as Baobab predicted (though hardly the work of an oracle), President Yoweri Museveni won at a canter. His main opposition rival, Kizza Besigye, protested the results. Even that had a sense of ritual about it. Mr Besigye has now lost three times to Mr Museveni. He has neither the funds, the message, nor the popularity to trump «M7». According to the official tally, Mr Museveni won with 68% of the vote, with Mr Besigye trailing on 26%. For the president, the result was an improvement on the 57% he scored in 2006. And it came without the thuggish treatment of the opposition that made a mockery of that election. With a measly voter turnout, Mr Museveni appeared not to need ghost voters or local officials to fabricate results in his favour. But few doubt those mechanisms were in place. A popular uprising looks unlikely. The army and police are squarely behind Mr Museveni. Exit polls indicate that even younger Ugandans were mostly forgiving of the corruption and dithering that has stalled the country’s development. Mr Museveni is now the longest ever serving leader in east Africa, outlasting Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere. And he still has at least five more years to go.

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Valg 2011 Uganda | Førvalgsrapport fra LSE

Uganda holder valg i morgen, og vi overlater dekning til The Monkey Cage og gjesteblogger Elliott Green (Utvikningsstudiet)fra LSE:

2011 Ugandan Presidential Election: Pre-Election Report:

We are pleased to welcome Elliott Green, a Lecturer in Development Studies at the London School of Economics, with the following pre-election report on tomorrow’s Ugandan presidential elections.

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President of Uganda Yoweri Museveni has just celebrated two important events: last year his reign overtook the tenure of all other presidents of Uganda combined, and last month he marked his 25th year in power. If he wins the national election scheduled for tomorrow and completes his term, he will surpass Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and William Tubman of Liberia as one of the longest-ruling heads of state in modern Africa.

In other words, Museveni appears to be heading towards territory previously populated by Africa’s more notorious autocrats and dictators like Banda, Eyadéma, Houphouët-Boigny, Mobutu and Mugabe, among others. Yet this was not the way things were supposed to turn out when Museveni first assumed office in 1986, when Uganda was a country synonymous with Idi Amin and economic collapse. Indeed, in Museveni’s first ten years in office he oversaw significant poverty reduction, economic growth, decentralization, the creation of a new constitution adopted by a democratically elected constituent assembly and presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996. Museveni’s rule was – and still is – also marked by a very adept foreign policy, which has led to close relationships with both Clinton and Bush despite Museveni’s previous history as an African socialist. (In his 1996 book What is Africa’s Problem you can still find a 1981 speech where he praises guerrilla leaders like Castro and condemns the My Lai massacre.)

Since 1996, however, Museveni has increasingly focussed his attention away from economic development and towards his maintenance in power. Perhaps most notoriously, in 2005 the Ugandan Parliament overturned presidential term limits in an implicit quid pro quo for allowing the restoration of multi-party politics. But so far Museveni has managed multi-party politics well, in particular by creating numerous patronage opportunities which allow him to buy off potential opponents and gather electoral support. Thus with 71 members Uganda now has the third largest cabinet in the world after Kenya and North Korea, thereby allowing Museveni to reign in old colleagues (known as ‘historicals’ in Uganda) like Eriya Kategaya.

But a large cabinet cannot deliver votes at election time: for that Museveni has relied upon the creation of new districts – the highest level of local government – which I have written about in more detail elsewhere (gated; ungated). When Museveni assumed power there were 33 districts, with 56 by 2000, 80 by 2006 and 111 today. Such has been the pace that Ugandans have invented a new word – districtization – for the process. While the government has claimed that new districts lead to better service delivery I found no evidence for their claims (in terms of health or education); I did find, however, that citizens in new districts have tended to vote more for Museveni and his party than in older districts across the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections. Moreover, as would be suggested by political science literature on patronage and clientelism, Museveni has created more districts as his electoral support has dropped over time, with five districts created in the five years before the 1996 election compared to 16 in 1996-2001, 24 in 2001-2006 and 31 in 2006-2011.

What makes district creation so attractive to Museveni as a patronage device is that they provide a large set of new government, construction and NGO jobs at the local level while not threatening his rule in Kampala. Thus, while Uganda recently surpassed Russia (with 83 federal subjects) as having the largest number of highest-level local government units in the world, the number of MPs per citizen in Uganda is lower than in nearby countries like Chad, Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the future state of South Sudan. The fact that district creation is a win-win situation for both the administration as well as voters has made Uganda merely the most extreme example of a large set of African countries that have created new local government units within a year or two of elections, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana most recently.

This shift within Uganda from a regime previously concentrated on spurring economic growth and strengthening democratic institutions towards one focussed on the creation of patronage has at least two implications for tomorrow’s election. First and most obviously, what makes patronage so powerful as an election strategy is that Museveni is the only candidate who can credibly commit to continue the flow of patronage if he wins. Indeed, Idi Amin created a large number of new local governments in the 1970s only to see many of them disappear after he was overthrown; moreover, inasmuch as donors such as USAID and the World Bank have long criticized the creation of new districts (and patronage and corruption more generally) it is an open question what would happen to the new districts if Museveni were to lose.

Secondly and finally, the government’s rationale behind district creation has in part been tied to Uganda’s incredibly high population growth, which means that there are the same number of citizens per district today as in 1974. But population growth has had profound consequences in other areas as well, most importantly in terms of spurring internal migration from higher-density areas towards lower-density areas and thereby provoking numerous local conflicts over land ownership. Far from attempting to encourage lower population growth, Museveni has in fact done the opposite, going so far as to praise the fact that Uganda’s population doubled during his first 19 years in office. Thus far population growth and local land conflicts have remained largely absent from national politics but they were a key focus for the US administration in one wikileaks cable and, if Kenya’s political history has any lessons for Uganda, then perhaps it is merely a matter of time before the link between local land conflicts and national politics establishes itself in Uganda as well.

(Via The Monkey Cage.)

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Valg i Uganda om 5. Bare så du vet.

Via Chris Blattman, en påminnelse:

Uganda goes to the polls in 5 days:

There’s little doubt that Museveni will win. But with every election that passes, I get a little more worried about the temperature of the country.

Polls are showing the main opposition candidate, Besigye, far, far behind Museveni. One reason is that Uganda has been doing well under Museveni (at least if you live in the southern half). Another, of course, is the incessant interference with the opposition’s campaign.

But Richard Vokes, a SOAS anthropologist, has an excellent blog piece on Besigye’s strategic missteps. There are too many points to quote easily. It should be read.

Andrew Mwenda, as usual, has a nice piece on why Besigye is probably the wrong candidate for a Uganda:

Uganda’s political terrain is changing to new ways that are rendering Kizza Besigye, just like Museveni, a relic of the past. The era of armed struggle is giving way to the era of street protest. Born of the former, Besigye seems ill-equipped to lead the new struggle. Both he and Museveni believe that the military gives an incumbent decisive advantage. But as Tunisia (and Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Philippines, Peru, Indonesia, South Korea, Chile etc before it) has shown, no army can defeat a people’s revolution when its time has come.

Therefore, if Besigye intends to adapt and lead successful street protests, he has to recognise that Museveni can only fall because he has transformed Uganda, not because he has kept it backward.

Also see Mwenda’s podcasts on the same site.

(Via Chris Blattman.)

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