Monthly Archives: oktober 2012

Marshmallow-eksperimentet. #Elskerdenne

Spicy Vanilla Marshmallows JPG

Eksperimentet er som følger: Unger får valget mellom å spise en marshmallow nå, eller å vente 15 minutter. Gjør de det får de en ekstra marshmallow.

Eksperimentet er egentlig fra 1972, men fordi barn verdsetter den ekstra marshmallowen, og de 15 minuttene det koster å skaffe seg den, basert på tidligere erfaringer gjøres eksperimentet med jevne mellomrom rundt omkring i forskingsmiljøer.

Back in 1972 Stanford psychologist Walter Mischel conducted experiments in which he claimed to show a correlation between patience and later success in life – in the experiment kids who could wait for 15 minutes before getting two marshmallows, instead of eating one immediately, were likely to be more successful and self-controlled later in life. Michel attributed patience and self-control to some of the kids’ innate capacities.

I 1972 var hypotesen at barna som verdsatte ventetiden høyt, og ventet for marshmallow #2, skulle bli mer suksessfulle senere i livet. Eksperimentet i nyere tid fokuserer heller på miljø.

We tested children (M = 4;6, N = 28) using a classic paradigm—the marshmallow task (Mischel, 1974)—in an environment demonstrated to be either unreliable or reliable. Children in the reliable condition waited significantly longer than those in the unreliable condition (p < 0.0005), suggesting that children’s wait-times reflected reasoned beliefs about whether waiting would ultimately pay off. Thus, wait-times on sustained delay-of-gratification tasks (e.g., the marshmallow task) may not only reflect differences in self-control abilities, but also beliefs about the stability of the world.

Les mer om det oppdaterte eksperimentet her.

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En utdannelse. #Foreldreerviktig

«Parents who help with homework and attend school events can outweigh the effect of weak schools, according to researchers in America.» Slik starter en nettsak publisert av BBC. Den fant veien til P4-nyhetene i dag dog 9 dager etter publiseringen til BBC. Det er publikasjonen Reseach in Social Strafification and Mobility som har publisert forskningen.

► Both family and school capital matter, with stronger effects of family capital.
► Findings show how access to social capital creates inequality in education outcomes.

Jeg kom til å tenke på all den forskningen som finnes innen utdanningsøkonomi, hvor Norge er helt i front, og hvilke konklusjoner som finnes der ute.

Så vi har forskning på at oppbygging av hva artikkelforfatterne over kalle sosial kapital, altså foreldres støtte i skolearbeidet, er viktigere enn hva som foregår på skolen.

Our study shows that parents need to be aware of how important they are, and invest time in their children – checking homework, attending school events and letting kids know school is important,” says Dr. Toby Parcel, a professor of sociology at NC State and co-author of a paper on the work. “That’s where the payoff is.

Det sier en av artikkelforfatterne, Toby Parcel, til sitt universitet. Jeg vil også ta med denne paragrafen:

The researchers found that students with high levels of family social capital and low levels of school social capital performed better academically than students with high levels of school social capital but low family social capital.

Så hva annet vet vi? Vel, fra forrige uke henter vi frem min alumni, NTNU. Du hørte vel Torberg Falch på radioen?

100 000 unge under 30 år hverken jobber eller studerer i Norge i dag. Noe som er en tragedie både for den enkelte og for samfunnet. De kan komme til å koste staten 700 milliarder kroner, har Professor Torberg Falch ved NTNU regnet seg frem til. For mange hundre ungdommer i norsk skole i dag er motivasjonen så lav at skolen er et meningsløst sted å oppholde seg. Og så å si alle som blir uførepensjonert, har det til felles at de har startet på, men ikke har fullført videregående utdanning.

Hvis du er interessert i dette, les mer om hvordan det ligger ann med fullføringen av norsk videregående skole her.

Hva annet vet vi? Vel, vi har forskning på før-barnehager fra USA.

We find that prekindergarten is associated with higher reading and mathematics skills at school entry, but also higher levels of behavior problems. By the spring of first grade, estimated effects on academic skills have largely dissipated, but the behavioral effects persist. Larger and longer lasting associations with academic gains are found for disadvantaged children. Finally, we find some evidence that prekindergartens located in public schools do not have adverse effects on behavior problems.

Vi har forskning på utdanning og helse:

Numerous economic studies have shown a strong positive correlation between health and years of schooling. The question at the centre of this research is whether the correlation between health and education represents a causal relation. This paper uses changes in compulsory schooling laws in the United Kingdom to test this hypothesis. Multiple measures of overall health are used. The results provide evidence of a causal relation running from more schooling to better health which is much larger than standard regression estimates suggest.

Utdannelse et IQ er et minefelt, men man kan starte her:

Studien av Brinch og Galloway undersøker spørsmålet ved å ta utgangspunkt i norske menn som ble berørt av skolereformen som forlenget obligatorisk grunnskole fra syv til ni år. Reformen ble gradvis innført i norske kommuner i perioden 1955- 1972. Forskerne ser på gjennomsnittlig IQ-økning blant menn i kommuner omfattet av reformen et bestemt år, og sammenligner dette med gjennomsnittlig IQ-økning blant menn i kommuner som ikke ble omfattet av reformen i det samme året. Denne forskningsstrategien sikrer at man fanger opp en effekt av utdanning på IQ og ikke en effekt av IQ på utdanning.

Vi har forskning på om studentassistenter hjelper (håper det, var èn i 3 år.)

Because students with alternative instructors may differ systematically from other students, the paper uses two empirical strategies: course fixed effects and a value-added instructor model. The results suggest that adjunct and graduate assistant instructors generally reduce subsequent interest in a subject relative to full-time faculty members, but the effects are small and differ by discipline. Adjuncts and graduate assistants negatively affect students in the humanities while positively affecting students in some of the technical and professional fields.

Redder jeg meg med at samfunnsøkonomi er et teknisk studio?

Denne er god – og ny. Kjetil Salvanes, Eirik Ø. Sørensen og Kai Liu sier at selv i utdanningssterke Norge er det problemer når resesjoner fillerister arbeidsmarkedet.

We find that initially mismatched workers from bad times suffer from persistent career losses compared with mismatched workers from good times. The careers of graduates who are initially matched to the right industry are largely immune from the negative impact of graduating in recessions in the medium run. Figure 8 shows that there are large differences in the extent of earnings loss in the first few years. Mismatched workers experience three-times-larger losses in annual earnings in the first few years than nonmismatched workers. Almost all of the persistent effects on unemployment are driven by mismatched workers.

Det er fra konklusjonen, skal lese hele i et ledig øyeblikk.

Har du mer fra utdanningsøkonomi?

Og Riksbankens minnepris i økonomi går til to match-makere.

Nobel economia12 700x400
Klokken halv fire i natt lokal tid i Melno Park sør for San Fransico, ringte telefonen til Al Roth. Han hørte den ikke. Under som en stein. Telefonen ringte igjen. Kanskje den burde tas?

“He spent a lot of time assuring me it wasn’t a prank,” says Roth. How did Roth feel about winning? “I was mostly waking up,” he says. “It was very unexpected but it wasn’t unimaginable.”

Mannen på telefonen hadde svensk aksent, noe som er naturlig for en som ringer fra den svenske Riksbanken.
Årets minnepris i økonomi, vi kaller den bare Nobelprisen i økonomi, hadde funnet en av årets to vinnere.

Al Roth, tidligere ved Harvard Business School – nå ved Stanford – og Lloyd Shapley, ved University of California Los Angeles, får årets Nobelpris i økonomi for en høyest praktisk årsak: Nemlig matching.

Lloyd Shaply, nå 89, la grunnlaget for å kunne løse spillteorier som foregikk i plenum. Det høres teoretisk ut, men tro meg at det har praktisk applikasjon. Eksempler kommer.

Roth tok teorien til den praktiske verden. Sånn, nå eksempler.

Roths tøffeste nøtt var ungdomsskoleproblemet i New York City. Hvordan får man 80 000 8.klassinger til å velge rett skole – av 700 skoler? Dette er et matching-problem. Før Roth begynte på dette problemet var ⅓ av alle 8.klassingene IKKE med i trekningen om ungdomsskoleplass. De var allerede da fortapt.

For å forklare hvordan dette går til, endrer vi arena. Til giftemål.

Hvordan matcher man egentlig menn og kvinner som vil gifte seg? (Stay with me on this.)

Mannens førstevalg er kanskje ikke gjensidig. Kvinnens førstevalg er heller kanskje ikke gjensidig. Hvordan matcher vi den mannen og den kvinnen som har hverandre som det beste valget, etter alle bedre kombinasjoner som ikke er mulige?

Dette er spillteori i plenum.

Hver mann frir til sitt førstevalg. Kvinnene som har flere enn to frierier viser så bort de minst foretrukne, men binder seg ikke ennå. De forviste mennene kikker seg rundt, går til sin nest mest foretrukne og frir på nytt. Og slik fortsetter de.

I skoleeksperimentet er studentene mennene og skolene er kvinnene. Roth benyttet seg av teorien til Shapley og skapte ett system hvor hver student måtte liste opp sine 12 mest foretrukne skoler – i prioritert rekkefølge. Deltakelsen i programmet gikk fra 66% til 93%. Studentene følte de fant en skole som passet, og begge parter var fornøyd med valget. Ikke begges førstevalg, men bedre enn andre kombinasjoner. Akkurat som mennene og giftemålene.

Ja, det er bare en illustrasjon, men valg av skole er ramme alvor.

Det er andre komplekse markeder som har trengt hjelp fra Roth og Shapley. Leger for eksempel. Turnusordninger for å være mer presis. 25 000 turnusleger i 1995. Særlig gifte turnusleger som ville praktisere samme sted. Ordningen, studentene som menn og sykehusene som kvinner, fungerte så godt at ikke bare var det gifte par som fikk et optimalt, under omstendighetene, valg av sykehus, men også spesialiteter innen helsevesenet.

Det er redesigning av markeder det er snakk om. Høyst pratisk økonomi. Markeder der vanlige prissignaler ikke er nok, eller er fraværende, til man når en likevekt på egen hånd. Som organlister.

Før Roth kom inn i bildet var det 85 000 på venteliste for organer, og 4 000 døde hvert år p.g.a. for få organer til alle. Systemet Roth nå forsøker å optimalisere er en ordning hvor mennesker som vil donere til et familiemedlem, men som ikke har rett blodtype, kan bytte organer med andre familiemedlemmer i samme situasjon. Nyretransplantasjoner er området som får en Roth-overhaling. Skal bli spennende å følge.

Alex Tabarrok:

What Roth has done is extend the Gale-Shapley algorithm to more complicated matches and to actually design such algorithms to solve real problems. In the 1970s, for example, the medical residency algorithm began to run into trouble because of a new development, the dual career couple. How to match couples, both doctors, to hospitals in the same city? By the 1990s assortative matching in the marriage market was beginning to derail matching in the doctor-hospital market! Roth was called in to solve the problem and moved from being a theorist to a market designer. Roth and Peranson designed the matching algorithm that is now used by Orthodontists, Psychologists, Pharmacists, Radiologists, Pediatric surgeons and many other medical specialties in the United States.

Tyler Cowen:

I think of this as a prize about how theory can be turned into usable results, how trade and matching can be made more efficient in concrete ways, how trade is a coordination game, and the intimate connection between issues of trade and issues of distribution.

Richly deserved by both men.

Steve Levitt (En av Freakonomics-gutta):

I know Roth changed my thinking because the first time I read Roth’s work in this area I had a strong reaction: this isn’t really economics. His applications, while based on general theories and principles, involve solutions that are highly dependent on the particular institutions and quirks of the setting he is studying. In my youth, I was under the illusion that economic principles should be universal. It was in part through my appreciation of Roth’s work, that I came to think very differently about the world and appreciate how critical it is to think about the specifics of the setting when coming up with solutions. Now, when I read Roth’s work, it definitely feels to me like economics. …

Bensin, Brown og Balifornia #Nestenalliterasjon #Bensinpriser

NewImage
I California har bensinprisen nådd all-time-high målt i gjennomsnittlige priser. $4,61 per gallon. Da jeg fylte på vårparten 2010 fortalte tallene en langt lystigere historie – $2,96.

Grunnen til dette er problemene med raffinerier. Og ikke nok med det, timingen er heller bisarr. Det er nå de forbereder omleggingen til vinterblandingen.

A web of refinery and transmission problems is to blame, analysts said. The situation is compounded by a pollution law that requires a special blend of cleaner-burning gasoline from April to October, said Denton Cinquegrana, executive editor of the Oil Price Information Service, which helps AAA compile its price survey.

«We use the phrase `the perfect storm,’ and you know what, this current one makes those other perfect storms look like a drizzle. I don’t want to scare anyone, but this is a big problem,» Cinquegrana said. «Run-outs are happening left and right.»

De høye bensinprisene har ført til at politikerne forsøker alt de kan for å bidra med midlertidig stimuli.

Gov. Jerry Brown took “emergency steps” Sunday to try to bring down record gas prices in the state.

He directed the California Air Resources Board to increase the fuel supply by allowing the immediate sale and import of cheaper and more available winter-blend gasoline.

The move would reduce the price of gas in California by 15 to 20 cents per gallon, probably within a few days, said energy expert Chris Faulkner of Dallas-based Breitling Oil and Gas.

Foto: AP Photo/Damian Dovarganes

Barn og Bly #NBER #Nerdete

Electron shell 082 lead
Hypoteste: Blyfri bensin og blyfri maling gir lavere kriminalitet og mindre aggressive skolebarn. Ny NBER-artikkel fra økonom Jessica Wolpaw Reyes.

Over the past 50 years, after scientists realized that even minute doses of lead can have harmful effects, policymakers have been steadily pushing to eradicate the stuff from the environment. In the United States, no one uses lead-based paint or fills up their cars with leaded gasoline anymore—those were phased out back in the 1970s and 1980s. Lead levels in the air have dropped 92 percent since then.

The paper finds that elevated levels of blood lead in early childhood adversely impact standardized test performance, even when controlling for community and school characteristics. The results imply that public health policy that reduced childhood lead levels in the 1990s was responsible for modest but statistically significant improvements in test performance in the 2000s, lowering the share of children scoring unsatisfactory on standardized tests by 1 to 2 percentage points.

Les mer her.

Ben Bernanke – Mythbuster

OB UU441 bernan E 20121001165720

Bernanke needs to do more of this: Debunking myths about savers, currency, fiscal policy enabling, monetizing the debt, creating inflation, and operating in secrecy. Bravo.

Joe Weisenthal over hos Business Insider er meget godt fornøyd med en tale den amerikanske sentralbanksjefen holdt ved Economic Club of Indiana mandag.

Hvorfor var akkurat denne talen så spesiell? Han og andre medlemmer av hovedstyret gir taler hele tiden, i forskjellige fora.

Vel:

Myths about the Fed are legion (repeated ad nauseam by pundits and politicians) and it seems that Bernanke realizes that the more exotic Fed policy becomes, the more he must inevitably debunk memes in order to justify his actions.

Utgangspunktet er at kontrasten mellom anklagene mot Bernankes handlinger og hans forsvar er rimelig stor.

Så når Bernanke slår det miste tilbake legges det merke til. Selv når det foregår i svært sentralbankede former.

Joe:

The first big one that Bernanke debunked is the idea that the Fed is an enabler of fiscal profligacy. This is something you hear all the time, and it’s total nonsense.

Even though our activities are likely to result in a lower national debt over the long term, I sometimes hear the complaint that the Federal Reserve is enabling bad fiscal policy by keeping interest rates very low and thereby making it cheaper for the federal government to borrow. I find this argument unpersuasive. The responsibility for fiscal policy lies squarely with the Administration and the Congress. At the Federal Reserve, we implement policy to promote maximum employment and price stability, as the law under which we operate requires. Using monetary policy to try to influence the political debate on the budget would be highly inappropriate. For what it’s worth, I think the strategy would also likely be ineffective: Suppose, notwithstanding our legal mandate, the Federal Reserve were to raise interest rates for the purpose of making it more expensive for the government to borrow. Such an action would substantially increase the deficit, not only because of higher interest rates, but also because the weaker recovery that would result from premature monetary tightening would further widen the gap between spending and revenues. Would such a step lead to better fiscal outcomes? It seems likely that a significant widening of the deficit—which would make the needed fiscal actions even more difficult and painful—would worsen rather than improve the prospects for a comprehensive fiscal solution.

This is really meaty, so let’s unpack what’s above.
One is that the Fed looks at basically two factors — employment and prices — when it decides how, when, and where to act. Unlike the ECB, the Fed does not use monetary policy as a stick in any way to influence fiscal policy.

He then turns to a related point, which is that the Fed is somehow «monetizing the debt» — printing money so that the government doesn’t have to legitimately pay off its obligations.

With monetary policy being so accommodative now, though, it is not unreasonable to ask whether we are sowing the seeds of future inflation. A related question I sometimes hear—which bears also on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, is this: By buying securities, are you «monetizing the debt»—printing money for the government to use—and will that inevitably lead to higher inflation? No, that’s not what is happening, and that will not happen. Monetizing the debt means using money creation as a permanent source of financing for government spending. In contrast, we are acquiring Treasury securities on the open market and only on a temporary basis, with the goal of supporting the economic recovery through lower interest rates. At the appropriate time, the Federal Reserve will gradually sell these securities or let them mature, as needed, to return its balance sheet to a more normal size. Moreover, the way the Fed finances its securities purchases is by creating reserves in the banking system. Increased bank reserves held at the Fed don’t necessarily translate into more money or cash in circulation, and, indeed, broad measures of the supply of money have not grown especially quickly, on balance, over the past few years.

This is key. If the Fed were monetizing the debt, then it would rip up the Treasuries it buys, so that the government doesn’t have to pay them off. As it is, these debts don’t go anywhere. The amount the government owns remains the same. Furthermore, because for every dollar the Fed «prints» via QE, an equivalent dollar is removed from the system, and so there’s no more money in the system.

That last line is key: «Increased bank reserves held at the Fed don’t necessarily translate into more money or cash in circulation, and, indeed, broad measures of the supply of money have not grown especially quickly, on balance, over the past few years.»

Bernanke then quickly debunks the idea that when inflation comes that it won’t be able to address it. People believe that the massive unwind of the Fed’s balance sheet would be so devastating, and that therefore the Fed is out of tightening tools.

Hogwasy says Bernanke:

For controlling inflation, the key question is whether the Federal Reserve has the policy tools to tighten monetary conditions at the appropriate time so as to prevent the emergence of inflationary pressures down the road. I’m confident that we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation when needed, and that we can do so in a way that allows us to shrink our balance sheet in a deliberate and orderly way. For example, the Fed can tighten policy, even if our balance sheet remains large, by increasing the interest rate we pay banks on reserve balances they deposit at the Fed. Because banks will not lend at rates lower than what they can earn at the Fed, such an action should serve to raise rates and tighten credit conditions more generally, preventing any tendency toward overheating in the economy.

Finally he gets on to one of the most powerful critiques of the Fed: The idea that it’s screwing savers.

As he notes, low rates are not just about Fed policy, they’re about the incredible economic events that have happened around the world post financial crisis:

I would encourage you to remember that the current low levels of interest rates, while in the first instance a reflection of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, are in a larger sense the result of the recent financial crisis, the worst shock to this nation’s financial system since the 1930s. Interest rates are low throughout the developed world, except in countries experiencing fiscal crises, as central banks and other policymakers try to cope with continuing financial strains and weak economic conditions.

He then goes onto note that saving isn’t just «having money in a bank» and that the main way to benefit everyone (including savers) is to induce growth:
A second observation is that savers often wear many economic hats. Many savers are also homeowners; indeed, a family’s home may be its most important financial asset. Many savers are working, or would like to be. Some savers own businesses, and—through pension funds and 401(k) accounts—they often own stocks and other assets. The crisis and recession have led to very low interest rates, it is true, but these events have also destroyed jobs, hamstrung economic growth, and led to sharp declines in the values of many homes and businesses. What can be done to address all of these concerns simultaneously? The best and most comprehensive solution is to find ways to a stronger economy. Only a strong economy can create higher asset values and sustainably good returns for savers. And only a strong economy will allow people who need jobs to find them. Without a job, it is difficult to save for retirement or to buy a home or to pay for an education, irrespective of the current level of interest rates.

The way for the Fed to support a return to a strong economy is by maintaining monetary accommodation, which requires low interest rates for a time. If, in contrast, the Fed were to raise rates now, before the economic recovery is fully entrenched, house prices might resume declines, the values of businesses large and small would drop, and, critically, unemployment would likely start to rise again. Such outcomes would ultimately not be good for savers or anyone else.

Bernanke needs to do more of this: Debunking myths about savers, currency, fiscal policy enabling, monetizing the debt, creating inflation, and operating in secrecy. Bravo.

Jeg fant, jeg fant! Jeg fant forskning på uføretrygd. #RandomizationInNorway

«Uføretrydprogrammer har lenge blitt kritisert av økonomer for å tilsynelatende føre til økt fravær»

Slik starter en artikkel (pdf) av Andreas Ravndal Kostøl (SSB og UiB) og Magne Mogstad (SSB og University College London), publisert i july i år. Den fortsetter (meg):

However, there is little empirical evidence of the effectiveness of programs that incentivize the return to work by DI recipients. Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in DI policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work.

Dette skal bli interessant lesing. UK har «Pathways To Work», USA har «$1 for $2 offset» (fengende?) I januar 2005 hadde Norge et program.

Artikkelforfatterne benytter seg av et uføretrygdprogram som gir redusert trygd for lønn. Altså mer lønnsomt å jobbe fordi for hver $1 i lønn reduseres trygd med $0,6. Netto skal det derfor lønne seg å jobbe.

Her er tre konklusjoner:

The insights from our RD analysis may be summarized with three broad conclusions.

First, many DI recipients have a considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. Three years after implementaton, the return-to-work program has increased the labor force participation of DI recipients aged 18-49 by 8 percentage points. In comparison, less than 2 percent of the control group participated in the labor force, and labor force participation among rejected DI applicants of the same age was approximately 30 percent.

Second, the return-to-work program produced a large increase in the earnings of DI recipients. These gains were accompanied by a small increase in disposable income and a substantial reduction in the cost of the program. The reduction in costs is attributable to a significant decrease in benefits and a small increase in the taxes paid by DI recipients.

Third, there is significant heterogeneity in the responsiveness to financial work incentives, indicating that targeted policies may be most effective in inducing DI recipients to return to work. Among DI recipients aged 50-61, who are approaching the retirement age, there is no evidence of any impact of the program. Within the group of DI recipients aged 18-49, the estimates vary substantially, with males, highly educated individuals, and people in areas with low unemployment showing the strongest responses to the financial incentives.

Eldre uføre er tyngst å få tilbake i arbeid. De unge er lettest å få tilbake i arbeid. Det er ikke banebrytende forsking, men er dokumentert i denne artikkelen i det minste.

Kan være spennende å sammenlikne ulike programmer, på både metode og utfall.

Storbritannias (mulige) tapte tiår.

Fredgraph

Adam Posen, hovedstyremedlem i Bank of England, har allerede snakket om dette.

I dag i Financial Times er det Lawrence Summers som tar for seg britenes økonomiske knipe. Britene våknet i dag til en produksjonsindeks som ligger under 50 (over 50 er positivt utsyn på økonomien) og til nyheten om at huspriser faller og at økonomien krymper (om så mindre enn man trodde).

Her er (litt) Lawrence i Financial Times:

…the primary determinant of fiscal health in both the US and UK over the medium term will be the rate of growth… austerity policies that slowed growth could even backfire in the narrow sense of raising debt-to-GDP ratios and turning debt unsustainability into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Britain must change the pace of fiscal consolidation to stand a chance of avoiding a lost decade… demand is needed for growth and the private sector is hanging back, the first priority must be for the public sector to stop exacerbating the contraction.

Fra budsjettet for 2012 ser vi hva han hinter til:

Skjermbilde 2012 10 02 kl 21 21 12Skjermbilde 2012 10 02 kl 21 21 25
Merk at finansdepartementet sier til alle som leser budsjettet: De neste 4 årene er det ikke noe hjelp å få av staten. For dere som lurer på hvor stor den britiske staten er av den totale økonomien, er svaret omtrent like stor som den norske. Ca. 45% av brutto nasjonalprodukt.

Figur 1.3 forteller historien enkelt. Det er investeringer som skal redde dagen. Økonomien får ingen hjelp fra privat forbruk, de neste 4 årene, noe som må være deprimerende.

Fortellingen fortsetter med 2.3:
Skjermbilde 2012 10 02 kl 21 32 04
Drøyt 5 prosentpoeng skal barberes av statsbudsjettet som andel av bruttonasjonalprodukt. Dette har blitt gjort før, se bl.a. Sverige, men det var ikke i etterskjelvene av den største finansielle krisen siden krigen.

(Kan jeg forøvrig anbefale litt grafmoro over hos FRED?)