Tag Archives: Kina

En appresiering av Kina. Free Exchange skriver om yuan/dollar:

Diskusjonen rundt en svak yuan, billigere å kjøpe kinesiske varer for alle oss andre og dermed ikke fra USA, er i ferd med å hetes opp igjen. Her er ett godt poeng, nemlig at en sterkere yuan ikke har den effekten på amerikansk sysselsetting som tror:

China, an appreciation:

WITH a China currency bill making its way through Congress, the debate over whether America ought to get tough with China is firing up yet again. The case for an aggressive American approach continues to look very weak to me. Some writers are taking on the idea that Chinese inflation is having much of an effect on its export competitiveness—that is, contributing to a real adjustment much larger than what’s observed in the nominal exchange rate. Kash Mansori makes an argument to that effect in this post, which has gotten a lot of attention. He compares CPI data in America and China and figures that Chinese prices have risen just 6.7% more than American prices since 2005—less of a contribution to adjustment, in other words, than one might have assumed.

That estimate seems unrealistically low to me. Looking at IMF figures on consumer prices and GDP deflators, the differential in inflation between 2005 and 2011 has been about 7 percentage points according to the former and 20 percentage points by the latter. The Economist put together an analysis of the real yuan-dollar rate and found that real appreciation has been significantly greater than nominal appreciation. From 2009 to early 2011, the analysis found, the yuan appreciated by just 4% in nominal terms, but by 17% in real terms, after accounting for inflation. The differential in wage growth has been more dramatic still. A Bureau of Labour Statistics report from earlier this year found that between 2002 and 2008, American manufacturing wages rose by just 20% while Chinese manufacturing wages doubled. 

Meanwhile, other writers seem not to appreciate the trade-off that’s actually on the table. Noah Smith seems to imply that critics of a «get tough» approach mainly think there would be no benefit to a yuan appreciation. I readily agree that there would be some benefit to both China and America of an appreciation in the yuan. It’s difficult to demonstrate that there would be substantial benefit, however. Mr Smith cites economist Menzie Chinn in support of the point that a yuan appreciation would benefit both parties. Fair enough, but Mr Chinn has also written that a dearer yuan might not lead to a big increase in Chinese imports and might not have much of an effect in the absence of a broader Asian appreciation. He also cites Eswar Prasad’s argument that a yuan appreciation would likely have little impact on American employment. There is a benefit there, but it’s not at all sure to be a large one.

Meanwhile, the yuan is appreciating, by a meaningful amount in nominal terms and by even more in real terms. And there is some set of potentially serious risks to getting tough with China, including the possibility of a major trade dispute between the world’s two largest economies at a time of significant global uncertainty and broadly declining industrial output.

So the question is what the expected value of a get-tough approach is likely to be. How much faster an appreciation is American pressure likely to induce? It’s hard to see how China would tolerate much more appreciation. So we have a small increase in the rate of change of a policy with relatively small benefits, and against that we have the risk of a major trade dispute between the world's two biggest economies at the worst possible time.

The issue is not that there’s no gain from appreciation. It’s that an aggressive American approach seems unlikely to generate appreciation over and above the current rate at an acceptable cost. The onus is on supporters of a get-tough approach to show that the trade-off is worth the trouble, and so far they’ve done nothing of the sort.

(Via Free exchange.)

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Hva? Kina møter Zimbabwe i ny skole: ‘The Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence’

Fascinerende lesing. Noen Zimbabwe/Kina-vitere som vil kommentere på denne:

Yet more unexpected sentences: «

[Zimbabwean] Defence minister Emerson Mnangagwa has told Parliament that the Chinese would channel the money through Treasury for the completion of the Robert Mugabe School of Intelligence.

Yes, you read that right.

The College will reportedly offer a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence and is poised to annually award both graduate and undergraduate degrees in Intelligence.

It appears to be a spy training center, and presumably opposition members will not be getting scholarships.

Story here. Hat tip @blakehounshell.

(Via Chris Blattman.)

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TED Talks | Martin Jacques – Hvordan forstå Kina?

Det er bare et spørsmål om tid før Kina er verdens største økonomi, og Martin Jacques forsøker å gi oss ett innblikk i hvordan å forstå Kina. Meget verdt de 21 minuttene foredraget varer, selv om det ikke er et fargesprakende slide-show han kjører.

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Kina, USA, handelsbalanse og valuta (Nerdete)

Δ exp t = β 0 + φ exp t-1 + β 1 y t-1* + β 2 q t-1 + β 3 z t-1 + γ 0 Δ exp t-1 + γ 2 Δ y *t-1 + γ 3 Δ y USt-2 + γ 4 Δ q t-1 + γ 5 Δ q t-2 + u t

Ser kjent ut? Kanskje ikke, så la meg fortelle hva noen prøver å finne ut her.

Dette er fra en interessant post fra Menzie Chinn over hos Econbrowser og spørsmålet er dette: Hvordan kan vi koble økonometri (disiplinen som etterforsker kausalitet i tall, matematisk disiplin i skillet mellom politikk og statistikk) og politikk. Hvordan er forholdet mellom Kinas handelsbalanse og den kinesiske valuta.

Her er hva symbolene over betyr: To obtain this conclusion, I used an error correction specification, where exp is now log real total Chinese goods exports, and y* is rest-of-world log GDP, and q is the log trade weighted exchange rate for the China (CPI deflated, from the IMF).

Her er hva Chinn kunne si om eksport og valuta:

However, one can still make some conclusions regarding exports. The results indicate that, holding all else constant, a 10% appreciation of the trade weighted real value of the yuan will induce a 7.5% reduction in Chinese exports. To get a feeling for the quantities involved, Chinese nominal exports in the 2009Q3-10Q4 period were $1.385 trillion. A 7.5% reduction of this amount is $104 billion; but a change in the value of the yuan should induce a partially offsetting $32 billion increase in total nominal value of exports (assuming 25% pass through, and 10% appreciation). The net dollar impact would then be only about $72 billion. This is not an unsubstantial impact, given 2009Q3-10Q2 trade balance was $155.6 billion (or the $200 billion forecast by China Economic Quarterly, or $212 billion in the IMF’s Article IV review of China).

Yin-Wong Cheung and I are now starting work to undertake an updated, and more comprehensive, look at Chinese elasticities.

Her er en fin oppsummering, med tanke på kort sikt og lang sikt:

Will renminbi appreciation solve the problems of the US. Here I agree with Professor Wu; on sustaining long term growth and reducing the current account deficit over the long term, increasing investment in human and physical capital and reining in the long term structural budget deficit are important. But to get to the long term, we need to survive the short term, and here expenditure switching via exchange rate changes is one important tool that can be effected much more quickly than in restructuring the US educational system.

Anbefaler å lese hele posten, som har linker til flere aktuelle artikler på handelsbalanse- og valutaspørsmål.

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Kina sitter på mye penger. Sentralbanken sitter på 20% mer enn i fjor. USA og Kina møtes neste uke forresten.

Howard Schneider skriver i The Washington Post:

At issue is the imbalance in their financial relationship. China’s central bank said Tuesday that Beijing’s holdings of foreign cash and securities amount to $2.85 trillion – a jump of 20 percent over the year before – despite Chinese promises to try to balance its trade and investment relations with the United States and other countries.

China added $200 billion to that stockpile in the last three months of the year alone, as the country socked away capital from the rest of the world at a torrid pace.

Les hele saken her.

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Spennende om mistelønn i Kina.

Ett kjapt søk på Google Scholar etter ‘minimum wage china’ gir få resultater. Så når jeg kom over denne posten fra bloggen Marginal Revolution, måtte den repostes:

Minimum Wage Impacts in China: Estimates from a Prespecified Research Design, 2000-2007

Jing Wang & Morley Gunderson
Contemporary Economic Policy, forthcoming

Abstract:
We use a prespecified research design to estimate the employment effect of minimum wages in China over the period 2000 to 2007. Our results are consistent with theoretical expectations and institutional realities of Chinese labor markets. These include: negative employment effects in slower growing regions; larger negative effects in non-state-owned organizations that tend to be more responsive to market pressures; much larger lagged effects reflecting the time needed for adjustments to occur; no adverse employment effects in the prosperous and growing Eastern region; and a positive employment effect in state-owned enterprises in the East – consistent with monopsonistic behavior.

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