Mer om Argentina og konkurser

Mark Weisbrot, Rebecca Ray, Juan A. Montecino og Sara Kozameh ved Center for Economic and Policy Research har en flott oppsummeringsartikkel om Argentina og lærdommene etter konkursen i 2001. For dere som ikke husker, årene 1999 – 2001 var tøffe for Argentina og det endte med mislighold av $100 milliarder og en kraftig devaluering. Grunnen til at mange kikker til Argentina er at det er den siste store konkursen. Det er uansett informativt å ta en titt, selv om ikke alle konkurser er like (last ned PDF fila og gjør klar gul-penn. Ikke mer enn 15 sider tekst og mange gode grafer.)

I vanlig stil, først graf, deretter tekst:
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Det er slik både dårlige og gode nyheter ser ut. Er det rart spanjoler flytter hjemlandet for tiden?

Fra artikkelen:

  • Argentina was trapped in a severe recession from mid-1998 to the end of 2001. Attempts to stabilize the economy and maintain the currency peg to the U.S. dollar, through monetary and fiscal tightening, led by the IMF and backed by tens of billions of dollars in lending, failed to arrest the economy’s downward spiral.
  • In December of 2001, the government defaulted on its debt, and a few weeks later it abandoned the currency peg to the dollar. The default and devaluation contributed to a severe financial crisis and a sharp economic contraction, with GDP shrinking by about 5 percent in the first quarter of 2002. However, recovery began after that one quarter of contraction, and continued until the world economic slowdown and recession of 2008-2009. The economy then rebounded, and the IMF now projects growth of 8 percent for 2011.
  • The country experienced this remarkable economic growth despite the default and difficulties borrowing from international financial markets over the past nine years, and relatively little Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).This should give pause to those who argue, as is quite common in the business press, that pursuing policies that please bond markets and international investors, as well as attracting FDI should be the most important policy priorities for any developing country government.
  • (Denne er interesant)
    Argentina’s rapid growth has often been dismissed as a “commodity boom” driven by high prices for its agricultural exports such as soybeans, but the data show that this is not true.
  • It is remarkable that Argentina has achieved its success in the face of adverse external circumstances, some of which continue to this day. Just one month ago the Obama administration, under pressure from “vulture funds” and their associated lobby groups, announced that it would oppose multilateral loans to Argentina.
  • Greece, which has been pursuing policies similar to those adopted by Argentina during its 1998- 2002 recession, is expected to need more than 9 years to reach its pre-crisis level of GDP. Unemployment, which is currently at 16 percent, could take even longer to reach normal levels. Trend level GDP is nowhere in sight.
  • Argentina’s experience also calls into question the popular myth that recessions caused by financial crises must involve a slow and painful recovery. Argentina’s financial crisis and collapse were as severe as that of almost any country in recent decades; and yet it took only one quarter after the default to embark on a rapid and sustained recovery. This is not only because of the devaluation and improved macroeconomic policies, but because the default freed the country from having to be continually hamstrung by a crippling debt burden and by pro-cyclical policies imposed by creditors.

Den siste er «går du konkurs, gå KONKURS» argumentet.

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