Denne fra University of Michigan og forfatterne Duchin og Sosyura. Den siste setningen i sammendraget er avslørende:
Overall, our evidence suggests that banks’ response to capital requirements may erode their efficacy in risk regulation.
Forskerne har hentet inn søknader for hjelp fra staten under finanskrisen i USA. Rent teknisk bruker de en ‘Difference-in-difference’ metode for å vise at etter å ha fått godkjent søknaden om finansiell hjelp økte faktisk antallet risikable lån og porteføljene skiftet mot mer risikable investeringer.
While we do not find a significant effect of the program on the aggregate amount of originated credit, our results suggest a considerable impact of government assistance on the risk of originated loans. After being approved for federal funds, program participants issue riskier loans and increase capital allocations to riskier, higher-yield financial securities, as compared to banks that were not approved for federal funds. A fraction of new capital inflows is also used to build cash reserves. Although the cash reserves reduce leverage and improve capitalization ratios, the net effect is a significant increase in systemic risk and the probability of distress due to the higher risk of bank assets.
The evidence in our paper is broadly consistent with the theories that predict an increase in risk taking incentives in response to government protection. From a policy perspective, our findings show that any capital provisions should establish clear investment guidelines and provide mechanisms for tracking the deployment of capital by recipient institutions in order to limit the unintended consequences of government aid.