I september 2008 gav hovedstyret i The Federal Reserve grønt lys til å redde forsikringsgiganten AIG. Sammen med finansdepartementet gav den lån verdt $182 milliarder. Nå har U.S. Government Accountability Office utgitt sin rapport om hva som skjedde.
Rapporten forsøker å belyse 4 ting.
- Nøkkelavgjørelser tatt
- ‘Maiden Lane III’ (MLIII) investeringsmetode
- I hvilken grad avgjørelser var i tråd med eksisterende lov
- Lekser lært fra AIG redningen
While warning signs of the company’s difficulties had begun to appear a year before the Federal Reserve System provided assistance, Federal Reserve System officials said they became acutely aware of AIG’s deteriorating condition in September 2008.
Although the Federal Reserve Board approved ML III with an expectation that concessions would be negotiated with AIG’s counterparties, FRBNY made varying attempts to obtain these discounts. FRBNY officials said that they had little bargaining power in seeking concessions and would have faced difficulty in getting all counterparties to agree to a discount. While FRBNY took actions to treat the counterparties alike, the perceived value of ML III participation likely varied by the size of a counterparty’s exposure to AIG or its method of managing risk.
A series of complex relationships grew out of the government’s intervention, involving FRBNY advisors, AIG counterparties, and others, which could expose FRBNY to greater risk that it would not fully identify and appropriately manage conflict issues and relationships.
Rapporten har en fantastisk tidslinje-grafikk på side 14, fra 2006 og helt til redningsbøyen september 2008.
Mens jeg leser denne rapporten er det fortsatt vanskelig å forstå at ingen, hverken The Fed, The Fed NY eller finansdepartementet har gjort noe slikt i sin historie; gjort noe så drastisk som å redde verden største forsikringsselskap.